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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relative contribution of capital deepening and total factor productivity 
(TFP) as drivers of labour productivity growth and catch up in Europe. Proxies for technological 
capabilities (technology gap) are introduced which allow to explain differences in TFP. Using a 
conditional Malmquist nonparametric approach, we find that capital deepening and TFP respectively 
account for around 53% and 47% of labour productivity growth respectively. Further, change in 
technological capabilities explains 71% of change in TFP, making a substantial contribution to catch 
up. Different patterns arise between industrialized and catching-up countries. Our results support the 
scope for innovation policy, technology diffusion and education policy to explain growth and 
convergence in labour productivity across Europe. 
JEL classification:  E23; O33; O47 
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1. Introduction 
Convergence in labour productivity (output per worker) is a key dynamic condition for European 
Union (EU) economic integration. A considerable exogenous shock (such as the current global turmoil) 
has demonstrated to bear different consequences across countries with different levels of labour 
productivity. Moreover the EU cohesion is based on the assumption that lagging behind countries will 
gradually catch up the more advanced countries in per capita income in the long run. This is  
reinforced by the fact that: (i) several countries have recently joined the EU as a result of the 
enlargement process, and (ii) four countries are currently candidates to join the EU in the coming 
years. This is very likely to exacerbate intra-EU economic differences. In fact, both these groups of 
countries are lagging behind in terms of income per capita and labour productivity. Figure 1 provides 
some impressionist evidence that an overall process of convergence in labour productivity has been 
occurring for the considered twenty-nine European countries relative to the period 1993-2007. That 
is, lagging behind countries seem to be catching up the more advanced EU Member states in terms of 
labour productivity. This paper investigates the drivers of this process. 
[FIGURE 1] 
Some studies point to capital deepening as an explanatory variable for differences in labour 
productivity (Kumar and Russell, 2002). Others argue that total factor productivity (TFP), in 
opposition to factor accumulation, plays a crucial role in bringing about productivity disparities (see 
among others Easterly and Levin, 2001; Jerzmanowski, 2007; Kutan and Yigit, 2007). We decompose 
labour productivity growth into capital deepening and (gross) TFP growth. Then, we further 
decompose (gross) TFP introducing proxies for technological capabilities (technology gap). Therefore 
TFP growth is decomposed into (i) net TFP (catching-up and exogenous technical change), and (ii) 
change in technological capabilities. While capital deepening and TFP have been largely addressed in 
this stream of research, technological capabilities have been quite underestimated. Our empirical 
results show that the omission of variables proxing for technological capabilities returns a different 
picture in terms of contribution to growth and TFP disparities.  
The concept of technological capabilities has been put forward to explain the success of the South 
Asian countries to catch-up thanks to their capacity to attract and absorb technology developed 
abroad (Kim, 1980). Lately, technological capabilities have been more broadly conceptualized as a set 
of necessary capabilities for countries to master technology from the perspective of external adoption 
and internal generation of technology and innovation (Goto and Suzuki, 1989; Kogut and Chang, 1991; 
Lall, 1992). This stream of research is conceptually linked to the notion of absorptive capacity where 
the idea is that a country needs to have a certain type and level of knowledge and skills to successfully 
adopt foreign technology. Scholars have investigated both the role of human capital (Nelson and 
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Phelps, 1966), R&D capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989), and institutions (Benson Durham, 2004) in 
facilitating the adoption of new technology in firms and countries (for a review see Keller, 2004). We 
follow Bell and Pavitt (1993) who regard technological capabilities as a pre-condition for countries to 
generate and manage technical change, both in terms of the introduction of new technology and 
innovation, as well as the incremental improvements of existing productive capacity. As such, they 
play a twofold role: their development is necessary for advanced countries to generate close-to-the-
frontier technology, while as far as catching up countries are concerned, they are key to adopt 
technology and benefit from international technology diffusion (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Keller, 
2004). In this sense, technological capabilities seem to be relevant whichever the distance of countries 
from the technological frontier. The set and combination of technological capabilities will vary 
depending on the stage of development of a country and on its specific industrial structure. We 
therefore take into consideration four different dimensions, customary in this literature, to account for 
technological capabilities: (i) innovation capability; (ii) codified knowledge; (iii) education; and (iv) 
labour force skills.1 
The convergence versus divergence argument has been central to the European integration debate 
since the very beginning. During the 1970s the Community regional policy, inspired by the hypotheses 
of Gunnar Myrdal (1957), tried to counter-balance the agglomeration of capital and human resources 
towards the more developed regions at the expense of the peripheral ones. Both the Structural Funds 
and later the Cohesion Fund were grounded on the non-convergence hypothesis and therefore aimed 
to compensate regions that were lagging behind due to the asymmetric effects of integration 
(Leonardi, 1995; Boldrin et al., 2001). Several empirical studies have already addressed convergence 
and catch up in productivity in Europe (see among others Martin, 2001; Giannetti, 2002; Kutan and 
Yigit, 2007; Neven and Gouymte, 2008; Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008). This paper builds on 
those results and provides some further contributions. First, the dataset is updated to 2007 and 
includes a larger number of European countries to account for the recent enlargement process. 
Specifically, the EU New Member States (NMS) have been included along with three Candidate 
countries (CCs).2 This allows investigating the current patterns of labour productivity in the light of 
the recent process of European enlargement. Second (as mentioned above), we introduce the role of 
technological capabilities to explain labour productivity growth and cross-country differences in TFP. 
Two main arguments have been proposed to explain differences in TFP. Some scholars argue that 
differences in TFP are due to inefficiency (efficiency explanation), while others propose an alternative 
explanation according to which countries tend to be efficient but not all the existing technology can be 
adapted in their economy (appropriate technology explanation) (Basu and Weil, 1998; Acemoglu and 
                                                 
1
 Another important factor is usually infrastructure. However, in our analysis infrastructure is accounted for by capital. 
2
 The NMS include: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovak 
Republic. The CCs include: Croatia, Island, and Turkey. We could not include Macedonia due to a lack of data. Also 
Cyprus and Malta have not been included in the empirical analysis. 
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Zilibotti, 2001; Los and Timmer, 2005; Jerzmanowski, 2007). In this paper we put forward a more 
general model accounting for both these explanations. To accomplish this task, we provide a modified 
version of the Malmquist nonparametric production model that is able to account for the relative 
contribution of the three factors (capital deepening, TFP and technological capabilities) under mild 
assumptions on the axiomatic production technology (Fare et al., 1994; Kumar and Russell, 2002; 
Jerzmanowski, 2007). The model is flexible enough to accommodate previous modelling strategies as 
special cases, thus providing a rationale base for the confrontation of alternative explanations of 
productivity patterns. Due to its nonparametric nature this approach accommodates cross-countries 
heterogeneity which has been recognized as a major problem when addressing convergence using 
standard parametric cross-country regression models (Durlauf et al., 2005).  
Moving to the empirical results, we find that, for Europe as an average, capital deepening and TFP 
respectively account for around 53% and 47% of labour productivity growth. By further decomposing 
TFP we find that change in technological capabilities explains 71% of change in TFP, thus accounting 
for 33% of labour productivity growth. The catch up component, along with the technological 
capabilities is prominent among lagging behind countries. These results are discussed in relation to 
other pervious studies in the conclusions. The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. The next 
section reviews the debate on TFP differences and explains our contribution. Section 3 presents the 
data and describes the methodological strategy, while empirical results are discussed in Section 4. A 
summary of the key findings and policy implications are discussed in the last section. 
 
2. Differences in total factor productivity: the state of the art and our 
contribution 
 
Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in cross-country differences in aggregate productivity 
(Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Kumar and Russell, 2002; Kumbhakar and Wang, 
2005; Jerzmanowski, 2007). Several contributions point to the role played by total factor productivity 
(TFP) (Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly and Levin, 2001; Caselli, 2005). Easterly and Levin (2001) 
conclude that “the residual (TFP) rather than factor accumulation accounts for most of the income and 
growth differences across nations”. However, as pointed out by Jerzmanowski (2007) “these studies 
uncover only the proximate cause of income differences, in the sense that the ultimate cause are those 
that lead to different levels of inputs and productivity” (p. 2081). 
Two main arguments have been put forward to explain these disparities. Some scholars argue that 
differences in TFP are due to inefficiency (efficiency explanation). That is, while all the countries face 
the same technological frontier, the observed differences reflect a distance of countries from the 
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frontier. An alternative explanation maintains that countries tend to chose their best technology mix 
(i.e. they are efficient), but not all the existing technology can be adapted in their economy 
(appropriate technology explanation) (Basu and Weil, 1998; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Los and 
Timmer, 2005). In their model, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) show that technologies invented by rich 
countries are not suitable for poor countries due to a different mix of input (e.g. skilled labor, 
machines). This leads to differences in incomes levels and a lack of convergence between poor and rich 
countries. Other studies point to the role of (or the lack of) institutions to account for differences in the 
capacity of countries in using efficiently technologies (Parente and Prescott, 1994; Krusel and Rios-
Rull, 1996). The importance of efficiency vs. appropriate technology has been addressed in a 
comprehensive paper by Jerzmanowski (2007). He finds that efficiency appears to be the main 
explanation for low income countries explaining 43% of output variation across 79 countries, with 
appropriate technology accounting for a lower share. 
This paper develops an empirical modeling which is compatible both with the efficiency explanation 
and the appropriate technology explanation. Figure 2 shows the functioning of these two explanations 
within a static context of technological frontier comparing country a and country b (with different 
levels of capital per worker). According to the efficiency explanation (left chart) all the countries face 
the same technological frontier. Countries below the frontier are inefficient while those onto the 
technological frontier are efficient. In this framework, the distance from the frontier reflects 
inefficiency that is entirely due to TFP. According to the appropriate technology explanation (right 
chart), each country faces a different technological frontier, but every country is perfectly efficient, i.e. 
lies on its frontier. In this context, country a cannot reach the upward frontier due to its endowment of 
inputs, i.e. technology and human capital. 
[FIGURE 2] 
Figure 3 summarizes our more general explanation. There are two different types of frontiers to be 
considered: the unconditional frontier (3) and the conditional frontier (1). The first is build as an 
external envelop of efficient points using the DEA. It hence represents the locus of the efficient 
countries at each point in time. The second is the frontier that each country faces conditional to its 
level of technological capabilities at each point in time (we call the technological capabilities variable 
“the Z’s”). In this setting the distance to the unconditional frontier (which we define gross TFP) is 
decomposed into two factors: net TFP and technology gap (the Z’s). Therefore, inefficiency is 
accounted for by the distance of country a to its conditional frontier, while the distance between the 
conditional frontier and the unconditional frontier is captured by the levels of the Z’s. In this sense, our 
case is more general than the efficiency explanation or the appropriate technology explanation. In fact, 
both of them are special cases of our setting. On the one hand, if all countries have the same level of Z 
(our technological capabilities variable) would follow that: (i) all countries are facing the same 
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conditional technological frontier (and this would collapse to the unconditional frontier), and (ii) 
differences in TFP are accounted for entirely by differences in efficiency (net TFP). On the other hand, 
if all the countries are efficient, they would all lie on their conditional technological frontier and all the 
differences in gross TFP would be entirely contingent upon differences in the levels of technological 
capabilities. 
[FIGURE 3] 
 
3. Data and methodology 
Data 
Table 1 summarizes the data collected for the empirical analysis. GDP is at constant prices and deflated 
by PPP’s. GDP per worker is our dependent variable, and represents a standard measure for labour 
productivity (see Kumar and Russell, 2002 among others). The stock of capital has been built using the 
permanent inventory method3. Labour is measured as the number of people employed. Four variables 
have been collected in order to account for technological capabilities. Patent is a standard measure of 
innovation output and has been broadly used in order to measure innovation performance of 
countries (Griliches, 1990; Trajtenberg, 1990). As such, they can be considered a “tolerable 
assumption” (Schmookler, 1962) of the innovative activities of firms. The variable “scientific and 
technical articles” represents the magnitude of the generation of codified knowledge and has been 
often used in composite indicators addressing technological capabilities (Archibugi and Coco, 2004). 
Specifically, it reflects the knowledge generated in the universities and public-funded research centres. 
We take it as a proxy of the wealth of the research system. Finally, public expenditure in education and 
labour force with tertiary education account for investment in the education system and the skill of the 
work force.4 We found these variables to be very volatile and decided to smooth them using the 
exponential moving average procedure. 
                                                 
3
 The permanent inventory method is a quite standard tool to build a capital stock series from an investment series. See, 
for example, Hall, R. E. and Jones, C. I., 1999. Why so some countries produce so much more output per worker than 
other do The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1), 83-116. 
 , Bernanke, B. and Gurkaynak, R., 2003. Is growth exogenous? Taking Mankiw, Romer, and Weil seriously. 
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2001 16  11-57. 
 , Iyer, K. G., Rambaldi, A. N. and Tang, K. K., 2008. Efficiency externalities of trade and alternative forms of 
foreign investment in OECD countries. Journal of Applied Econometrics 23  749-766. 
  
4
 Very often growth studies take secondary enrolment as a measure of education. Given the fact that we are dealing with 
advanced and emerging countries, we decided to take these two other variables to address the quality of human capital. 
In this way, education expenditure provides an overall measure of public investment in education, while labour force 
with tertiary education accounts for the observed upper level quality of the labour force. These have demonstrated to be 
the most important source of growth for these types of countries, see Lee, K. and Kim, B., 2009. Both institutions and 
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[TABLE 1] 
 
The production model 
This section presents our nonparametric model. We propose a model that can be considered as a 
general version of those put forward by the inefficiency explanation and the appropriate technology 
explanation. We consider GDP as the outcome of a production process where capital and labour 
represent the inputs. The four technological capabilities variables are treated as external variables that 
condition the production process (see for example Daraio and Simar, 2005). Therefore the production 
technology is conditional on the observed level of the four external variables (
4R∈Z ). The 
production set is given by all the possible combinations of capital and labour able to produce a given 
level of output (GDP), conditional on 
4R∈Z  at time t: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }tandgivenYproducecanLKRLKYtT ZZ ,,:,,, 3+∈=  (1) 
A functional representation for this axiomatic technology is provided by the conditional output 
distance function: 
( ) ( ) 1,,,:0min,|,, ≤






∈




>= tTLK
Y
tLKYDo ZZ θ
θ
θ
 (2) 
where the output distance function is conditional on the value of the technological capabilities Z5. The 
previous specification means that our model accommodates two important phenomena: first, the 
possibility that a country is lagging behind with respect to the international production frontier (the 
inefficiency parameter θ); second, it incorporates explicitly the role of technological capabilities in the 
production model through the introduction of the conditioning variables Z. What these assumptions 
mean is that two countries with same level of capital and labour can produce very different output 
levels according to the level of their technological capabilities. We assume the following monotonicity 
conditions of the conditional output distance function: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
policies matter but differently for different income groups of countries: Determinants of long-run economic growth 
revisited   World Development 37 (3), 533-549. 
  
5
 Since our empirical application uses only one output (GDP), the technology can be equally well represented via a 
production function (although we choose the output distance function due to its generality): ( )tLKFY ,|, Z⋅=θ , 
where 10 ≤< θ  is the inefficiency parameter. The production function can be derived directly by the output distance 
function as: ( )
( )tLKF
Y
tLKYDo
,|,
,|,,
Z
Z = . In other words the output distance function is a measure of “loss” in 
output or a measure of distance from the production frontier. 
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1. Non-decreasing in output: ( ) ( )tLKYDtLKYD oo ,|,,,|,, 10 ZZ ≤ , 10 YY ≤ ; 
2. Non-increasing in inputs: ( ) ( )tLKYDtLKYD oo ,|,,,|,, 1100 ZZ ≤ , 10 KK ≤ , 10 LL ≤ ; 
3. Non-increasing in the external variables: ( ) ( )tLKYDtLKYD oo ,|,,,|,, 10 ZZ ≤ , 10 ZZ ≤ . 
Assumptions 1) and 2) are quite standard. The first one says that increasing the level of output for a 
given level of inputs does not decrease the value of the distance function, i.e. does not decrease the 
efficiency of production. The second assumes that increasing the level of inputs for a given level of 
output does not increase the distance function, i.e. does not increase the efficiency of production. The 
third assumption needs some more detailed explanation. We assume that the external variables have 
the same monotonicity behavior of the inputs, in other words increasing the value of these variables 
do not increase the value of the distance function. This means that larger values of these variables 
displace the production frontier upwards allowing a larger production for a given level of inputs. Such 
an assumption is quite reasonable if one thinks that these conditioning variables are proxies for the 
level of human capital and for the effort that a country puts into innovation activities. Finally we do not 
make assumptions on the behavior of time; this means that when time passes the value of the distance 
function can increase (technical progress) or decrease (technical regress). It should also be stressed 
that our nonparametric model accommodates biased technical change, i.e. we do not assume Hicks 
neutrality (or any other type of neutrality) in technical change. Moreover, technical change is country 
specific, meaning that at different points of the production technology there could be different 
magnitudes and biases of technical change. Following standard practice in the macroeconomic 
literature constant returns to scale (CRS) are assumed. With the previous assumptions in place, the 
output distance function is homogeneous of degree one in output and homogeneous of degree -1 in 
inputs (Fare and Primont, 1995). The production set (1) is conditional to the value of the Z’s variables. 
Omitting the Z’s one obtains an unconditional or unrestricted production set: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }tgivenYproducecanLKRLKYtT ,,:,, 3+∈=  (3) 
Since we use a DEA approach it is easy to verify that ( ) ( )tTtT ,Z⊇  which means that the Z’s are 
constraining production. The unconditional output distance function associated to the unconditional 
production set (3) will thus depend only on the output and inputs (the Z’s are omitted): 
( ) 1,,:0min,, ≤






∈




>= TLK
Y
LKYDo θ
θ
θ
 (4) 
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Following Daraio and Simar (2005), a comparison of the conditional distance function (2) to the 
unconditional distance function (4) gives a static measure of the magnitude of the impact of the Z-
variables onto the production process: 
( ) ( )
( )tLKYD
LKYD
LKYtZC
o
o
,|,,
,,
,,|,
Z
Z =   (5) 
Since ZC belongs to the unitary interval, the Z-conditional production frontier (1) collapse to the 
unconditional production frontier (3) when the level of technological capabilities is not binding 
production (i.e., ZC=1). In other words equation (5) provides a measure of the distance between the 
conditional and the unconditional frontier (or, in other words, a measure of the technology gap). 
The measure we provided in equation (5) is intrinsically static and it gives information on the 
technological capabilities gap at any point in time. A dynamic measure can be obtained very easily. A 
total factor productivity index can be defined keeping the technology fixed at the base period level and 
allowing the other variables to move (see, for example, Fare et al, 1994). This returns the Malmquist 
base period measure of total factor productivity growth: 
( )
( )tLKYD
tLKYD
TFP
tttt
o
tttt
ot
,|,,
,|,, 1111
Z
Z
++++
=  (6) 
Similarly, one can fix the technology to the comparison period level, obtaining a comparison period 
measure of productivity growth: 
( )
( )1,|,,
1,|,, 11111
+
+
=
++++
+
tLKYD
tLKYD
TFP
tttt
o
tttt
ot
Z
Z
 (7) 
Taking the geometric mean, we obtain a Malmquist index of total factor productivity growth: 
[ ]2
1
1 tt TFPTFPTFP +=   (8) 
This index has been introduced by Caves et al. (1982), popularized by Fare et al (1994) and more 
recently applied by Kumar and Russell (2002) and Jerzmanowski (2007) with growth accounting 
decompositions purposes. It should be noted that, contrary to these previous studies (which use 
unconditional production frontiers), our productivity measure is conditioned by time and by the Z-
variables. This means that observations with different Z-variables face different production frontiers 
and the productivity index account for that. This productivity measure decomposes into two different 
components. First, a measure of catching-up (TEC): 
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( )
( )tLKYD
tLKYD
TEC
tttt
o
tttt
o
,|,,
1,|,, 1111
Z
Z +
=
++++
  (9) 
Since our model allows deviations from the production frontier this index account for the trend in this 
deviation. A value of TEC larger than one means that the country has moved closer to the conditional 
production frontier (catching-up), while a value smaller than one means that the country is falling 
behind with reference to the conditional production frontier. The second component of TFP is a 
measure of exogenous technical change (TC) and it can be obtained into two different ways. The base 
period index of local technical change is: 
( )
( )1,|,,
,|,,
1111
1111
+
= ++++
++++
tLKYD
tLKYD
TC
tttt
o
tttt
ot
Z
Z
  (10) 
while the comparison period local technical change index is: 
( )
( )1,|,,
,|,,1
+
=+
tLKYD
tLKYD
TC
tttt
o
tttt
ot
Z
Z
  (11) 
The geometric mean of these two procedures avoids the arbitrariness of choosing one procedure 
instead of the other: 
( )2
1
1+= ttTCTCTC   (12) 
This index gives a measure of local technical change, with values larger than one for technical progress 
and values smaller than one for technical regress. It is easy to verify that the product of the TEC 
component by the TC component returns the original Malmquist TFP index: 
TECTCTFP ⋅=  (13) 
The Malmquist index defines a net measure of productivity change. Since the Z’s are constraining 
production, their variation displaces the conditional frontier closer or farther to the unconditional 
frontier. Therefore the contribution of the Z’s can be accounted for by the following index that 
quantifies the impact of technological capabilities (ZCC) onto labour productivity: 
( )
( )
( )
( )tLKYD
tLKYD
tLKYD
tLKYD
ZCC
tttt
o
ttt
o
ttt
o
tttt
ot
,|,,
,,,
,,,
,|,,
1111
111
++++
+++
=
Z
Z
 (14) 
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This index accounts for the variation in the ( )tLKYZC ,|,, Z  function of equation (5) and it is a 
measure of the impact of Z’s. To be precise, it should be noted that this index is composed by two sub-
components. The first represents the “pure” effect of the Z’s: 
( )
( )tLKYD
tLKYD
tttt
o
tttt
o
,|,,
,|,,
1+Z
Z
 
This index take a value equal to one if 1+= tt ZZ  and different from one if 1+≠ tt ZZ . In this second 
event the index will be larger than one if the overall impact of the change in technological capabilities 
has been positive and smaller than one otherwise. The other sub-component is an interaction effect 
between the factors of production and the technological capabilities: 
( )
( )
( )
( )tLKYD
tLKYD
tLKYD
tLKYD
tttt
o
ttt
o
ttt
o
tttt
o
,|,,
,,,
,,,
,|,,
1111
1111
++++
++++
Z
Z
 
To avoid the complexities associated to such a sub-decomposition, we will consider only index (14) 
which incorporates both the “pure” effect of the Z’s and their interaction effect with the factors of 
production. An alternative index for the impact of technological capabilities is the comparison period 
one: 
( )
( )
( )
( )1,|,,
1,,,
1,,,
1,|,,
1111
111
1
+
+
+
+
= ++++
+++
+
tLKYD
tLKYD
tLKYD
tLKYD
ZCC
tttt
o
ttt
o
ttt
o
tttt
ot
Z
Z
 (15) 
To avoid the arbitrariness of choosing one index rather than the other, we compute a geometric mean 
index for the impact of technological capabilities onto output per worker growth: 
( )2
1
1+= ttZCCZCCZCC  (16) 
Finally, one can account for the effect of capital deepening considering a base and a comparison period 
index: 
( )
( )
( )
( )tkyD
tkyD
tLKYD
tLKYD
L
L
KD
tt
o
tt
o
ttt
o
ttt
o
t
t
t
|1,,
|1,,
|,,
|,,
1111 ++++ ==  (17) 
( )
( )
( )
( )1|1,,
1|1,,
1|,,
1|,,
11
1
111
1
1
1
+
+
=
+
+
= ++
+
+++
+
+
+
tkyD
tkyD
tLKYD
tLKYD
L
L
KD
tt
o
tt
o
ttt
o
ttt
o
t
t
t
 (18) 
Taking the geometric mean of the previous two components one obtains the capital deepening effect: 
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( )2
1
1+= ttKDKDKD  (19) 
The product of the four components (TEC, TC, ZCC and KD) returns a decomposition of output per 
worker growth (growth accounting): 
KDZCCTFPKDZCCTCTEC
LY
LY
tt
tt
⋅⋅=⋅⋅⋅=
++ 11
 (20) 
It is useful to provide an additional graphical representation of the dynamic process. In figure 4 two 
hypothetical observations are represented: ( )tt ky ,  facing technology ( )tT t ,z  and ( )11, ++ tt ky  facing 
technology ( )1,1 ++ tT tz . The difference in output per worker 
t
t
y
y 1+  can be ascribed to three different 
movements. First, keeping the technology fixed at ( )tT t ,z  we consider the impact of the capital 
deepening effect from point A to point B. Second, we account for the effect of technological capabilities 
considering the hypothetical technology ( )tT t ,1+z ; thus the movement from point B to point C. Third 
we consider the contribution of total factor productivity growth, considering the movement from the 
hypothetical frontier ( )tT t ,1+z  to the observed frontier ( )1,1 ++ tT tz ; thus the movement from point C 
to point D. Summing-up, output per worker growth can be decomposed as: 
TFPZCCKD
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
C
t
B
C
t
B
t
t ⋅⋅== ++ 11 . 
[FIGURE 4] 
Equation (20) is our growth accounting equation which imputes labour productivity growth to 4 
different components: catching-up (or falling behind) effect (TEC), technological capabilities change 
(ZCC), exogenous technical change (TC) and capital deepening (KD). Since the contribution of ZCC 
enlarges the production technology it can be interpreted as a contributor to productivity growth. Our 
TFP component (8) is a net measure of productivity growth, therefore taking the product of TFP by 
ZCC returns a measure of gross productivity growth (GTFP): 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
1
111111
1,,,
1,,,
,,,
,,,






+
+
=
++++++
tLKYD
tLKYD
tLKYD
tLKYD
GTFP
ttt
o
ttt
o
ttt
o
ttt
o  (21) 
This returns a quite surprisingly simple result, i.e. given our assumptions gross productivity change 
can be computed simply omitting the Z variables from the production model. Since this is the way 
followed by the most part of authors, our methodology can be interpreted as a way of decomposing 
gross TFP, where gross TFP is measured as in the rest of the literature. In other words, our model 
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generalizes previous models and maintains comparability. In fact, aggregating the TFP and ZCC 
components one obtains the Kumar and Russell (2002) and Jerzmanovsky (2007) growth accounting 
procedure: 
KDGTFPKDZCCTFP
LY
LY
tt
tt
⋅=⋅⋅=
++ 11
 (22) 
where the only components are gross TFP growth and capital deepening. All the previous distance 
functions needed to compute the different indexes are estimated using DEA linear programs (see 
appendix B). 
 
4. Empirical results 
A picture of the unconditional production frontier is reported in figure 5. It is very clear from this 
picture that the shift in the production frontier is not neutral. In fact, the displacement at high values of 
capital per worker is much stronger than at low values. This means that countries with high levels of 
capital per worker benefited more from technical change and TFP growth. The result is in line with 
Kumar and Russell (2002), who also obtain a similar biased shift in the technological frontier.   
[FIGURE 5] 
Table 2 summarizes the results of our output per worker decomposition for all 29 countries. In a first 
step, labour productivity change has been decomposed into two main components: capital deepening 
and gross TFP change (columns 4 and 5). The overall averages provided in the last row suggest a 
similar contribution to the growth in labour productivity, with capital deepening accounting for 57% 
and gross TFP accounting for 43% of total growth. In a second step we decomposed gross TFP change 
in technological capabilities change (ZCC) and net TFP change (columns 6 and 7). It arises that the 
change in technological capabilities explains a good deal of the change in gross TFP (around 71%), 
thus accounting for 33% of overall labour productivity growth. The further decomposition of net TFP 
in catch-up effect (TEC) and exogenous technical change (TC) reported in the last two columns shows 
the significant role of the former vis-à-vis the negligible role of the latter.  
[TABLE 2] 
We have also divided the countries into two different groups. The EU-16 group includes the ‘old’ EU 
Member States, which are also the more industrialized countries. While the EU-13 group includes both 
the New Member States and the Candidate Countries (see note in table 2). The differences between the 
two groups are striking. As regards the EU-13, labour productivity growth has been substantially 
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higher (4.5%) in opposition to the EU-16 (1.9%). As far as the relative contribution to labour 
productivity growth is concerned, capital deepening is similar for the two groups of countries (around 
50% of total labour productivity growth), while significant differences emerge for technological 
capabilities and net TFP. The former accounts for 29% of total change in the EU-16 group, while it 
accounts for 38% of total change in the EU-13 group. Net TFP accounts for 19% and 10% relative to 
the EU-16 group and the EU-13 group respectively. A remarkable difference also arises from the 
decomposition of the net TFP. EU-16 countries benefited from exogenous technical change, while this 
has a negative role for EU-13 countries. By contrast, the latter considerably benefited from the 
catching up effect (TEC). 
As mentioned in the previous section, the ratio in equation (5) of the unconditional distance function 
to the conditional distance function is a measure of the impact of the Z’s on the production frontier 
(see Table A.1 in the Appendix). Lower values suggest a strong impact of the Z’s, while values close to 
1 reflect a moderate importance of the Z’s (a value equal to 1 reflects countries where the 
unconditional frontier overlap with the conditional frontier). The overall average is 0.84 and very 
stable across years. On the contrary it varies considerably across countries. Figure 6 shows index (5) 
(static impact of the technological capabilities). Considerable differences emerge between the EU-16 
and the EU-13,6 which implies a more important role played by technological capabilities for the EU-13 
countries.  
Our model aims to generalize those provided by the efficiency explanation and appropriate technology 
explanation (cf. Figure 2, 3). As explained above, in our setting the Z’s account for the appropriate 
technology explanation. The trends outlined in Figure 6 suggest that the appropriate technology 
explanation is prominent for catch-up countries while it plays a moderate role for advanced countries, 
consistently with Jerzmanowski (2007). Further, the upward trend of the EU-13 group suggests a 
relative lower importance as far as the EU-13 countries tend to catch up. 
[FIGURE 6] 
The next figure summarizes our calculations by plotting the change rates of the three components 
against output per worker in 1993, with simple regressions. By looking at the charts, the EU-13 
countries seem to catch up both in terms of capital deepening and technological capabilities, while  the 
contribute of gross TFP does not seem to make a significant contribution. Figure 7 reports the gross 
TFP decomposition into a catch-up component (TC) and an exogenous technical change component 
(TC). It shows that the TC component is an important factor of convergence while exogenous technical 
                                                 
6
 One can dispute that Iceland is in fact a catch up country. Taking Iceland out would reinforce the results as the EU-13 
line would shift slightly downward, but it would not affect the dynamic picture. 
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change tends to increase divergence. This basically explains why net TFP does not show a clear 
pattern.  
[FIGURE 7] 
[FIGURE 8] 
Overall a convergence process in labour productivity growth can be ascribed to an interaction of 
factors. The EU-13 group shows, on average, a lower value of capital per worker and the catch-up 
process starts with a low level of efficiency, technological capabilities and capital per worker. Then, the 
convergence process seems to be lead by capital deepening, catch-up and technological capabilities 
accumulation in a first stage. Only when a country reaches a larger level of capital per worker is able to 
exploit the TFP change (due to the TC component) that happens at the higher level of capital per 
worker. It seems that, once this stage is reached, the static effect of technological capabilities (as 
proxied by our ZC index) turns out to be diminished.  
It is worth commenting how different patterns of convergence arise also within the EU-13 group. 
Specifically, the three Baltic Republics – Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia – show a different and specular 
pattern when compared to Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, even though they started at similar levels 
of labour productivity level in 1995 (cf. Figure 1). The former seem to have based their catch up 
process mainly on capital deepening in opposition to technological capabilities, while the opposite is 
true for the latter. Interestingly, these countries are also geographical clustered.  
 
4. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This paper investigates the source of growth and catch up of labour productivity in the current 
framework of EU enlargement, in the period 1993-2007. We propose a general model to merge the 
efficiency explanation and the appropriate technology explanation introduced previously in the 
literature to explain cross-country TFP differences. Variables proxing for the level of technological 
capabilities have been introduced to explain TFP differences across countries. To accomplish this task 
we follow a nonparametric production approach and Malmquist indexes decompositions. We start by 
pointing out an overall process of convergence in labour productivity occurred over the considered 
period relative to the 29 countries: lagging behind countries exhibit higher rates of labour productivity 
growth (4.5%) with respect to the more industrialized European countries (1.9%). Labour 
productivity growth is decomposed into three components: capital deepening, TFP change, and 
technological capabilities change. Further, TFP is decomposed into an exogenous technical change 
effect and a catching up effect. 
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For Europe as a whole, productivity growth is mostly driven by capital deepening and the change in 
accumulation of technological capabilities. By contrast, TFP does not seem to make a relevant 
contribution. Different patterns arise between industrialized and catching-up countries. As for the 
former, the accumulation of technological capabilities contributed in a more important way in 
opposition to TFP, which in turn is more prominent regarding industrialized countries (with 
technological capabilities playing a less important role). Our further decomposition of net TFP into 
exogenous technical change and a catch up component allowed us to single out additional differences 
between these two groups of countries. As for lagging behind countries, it arises a considerable catch-
up effect while exogenous technical change has been negative. By contrast, industrialized countries 
benefited by far from exogenous technical change (this last component tends to exacerbate cross-
country differences in labour productivity). This is consistent with a non-neutral shift of the 
technological frontier observed in our analysis (see figure 5) (for similar finding see Kumar and 
Russell, 2002), as well as with those arguments pointing to a lower capacity of countries distant from 
the frontier to master close-to-the-frontier technical change (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001; Acemoglu 
et al., 2006). In brief, rich countries tend to generate technology that is not compatible with the factor 
mix of lagging behind countries.  
Our results point to the importance of technological capabilities as an explanatory variable for cross-
country differences in gross TFP. Once technological capabilities are included, the net TFP no longer 
show up as a key variable. Kumar and Russell (2002) find that growth was largely attributable to 
capital deepening, while (gross) TFP plays a negligible role. This difference can be ascribed to 
differences in the sample. In their paper the very low effect of TFP is due to larger negative figures for 
very low-income countries. In their study technology is only exogenous, as captured by the shift of the 
technological frontier. Moreover some key variables such as human capital are not included, as they 
recognized themselves. Their findings are in contrast with other several studies pointing to the 
importance of TFP instead of factor accumulation to explain cross-country differences in growth rates 
(Easterly and Levin, 2001). In a recent study Jerzmanowski (2007) shows the relative importance of 
the efficiency view and the appropriate technology view in explaining TFP differences. Within a 
customary Cobb-Douglas framework he provides evidence for both explanations.7 Along a similar line, 
our results show that an important share of the contribution of gross TFP to productivity growth can 
be accounted for by the change in technological capabilities.  
Our results need to be further qualified. Capital deepening has demonstrated to be as much as relevant 
as gross TFP in explaining productivity growth. This might seem at odds with studies showing that 
TFP accounts for the lion’s share of productivity growth. However, this is not so surprising considering 
                                                 
7
 He also shows that by relaxing the Cobb-Douglas assumption by using a DEA non parametric approach, consistent 
with that used in this paper, this method tends to give more importance to the fraction of variation of output explained 
by factor accumulation vis-à-vis TFP. 
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our specific sample. The latter includes emerging economies whose distance from the technological 
frontier can be by all means considered inferior to many developing countries usually included in the 
empirical studies discussed. This reduces their catch up opportunities and explains the greater 
importance attached to capital deepening and technological capabilities in our results. Moreover, 
many of the studies that find a large contribution of TFP might incur a specification error, since they 
adopt very restrictive functional forms (i.e. Cobb-Douglas) for the production frontier. This is likely to 
increase the effect of TFP versus factor accumulation (Jerzmanowski, 2007). 
Summing up, this paper contributes in two ways to the current debate on the sources of cross-country 
differences in growth and productivity. First, it introduces the concept of technological capabilities as a 
means to explain cross-country differences in productivity growth and TFP. Second, in order to 
explore the efficiency explanation vs. appropriate technology explanation, it provides a more general 
methodological framework using a nonparametric production approach and Malmquist indexes 
decompositions. 
Our empirical findings bear some consequences in terms of policy. NMS and CCs do not benefit from 
exogenous technical change and this suggests that economic integration per se is not a sufficient 
condition for lagging behind countries to catch-up. The opportunity for lagging behind countries to 
catch-up (and ultimately the cohesion of an enlarged Europe itself) cannot be grounded solely on 
automatic mechanisms such as spillover effects and capital going towards countries with lower levels 
of labour productivity. On the contrary, it rests on policies that point to a substantial endogenous 
effort in terms of innovation capabilities, education and research system, and skills of labour force.     
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Appendix A – Figures and Tables 
 
Fig. 1. Convergence in output per worker over the period 1993-2007, 29 European countries  
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Fig.2. The efficiency explanation vs. the appropriate technology explanation  
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Fig. 3. The technological capabilities explanation 
 
 
Table 1 - Variables and sources 
  Variable Sources 
 
GDP per worker: GDP (PPP, constant prices) Penn World Table 
measure of productivity (dependent variable) Labour force Penn World Table 
   
Capital deepening Fixed capital (build with the permanent inventory method) Penn World Table 
   
Technological capabilities accumulation (Z) Patents application in the European Patent Office OECDstat 
 Articles published in scientific journals WDI (World Bank) 
 Public expenditure in education WDI (World Bank) 
  Labour force with tertiary education WDI (World Bank) 
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Fig. 4. The decomposition of labor productivity over two time period 
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Fig. 5. The unconditional production frontier, 1993 and 2007. 
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Table 2 - Percentage change of output per worker decomposition 1993-2007, 29 countries 
 
        Contribution to change in GDP per worker 
            Gross TFP Net TFP 
Country 
GDP per 
Worker 
1993 
GDP per 
Worker 
2007 
Percentage 
GDP per 
Worker 
Growth 
Capital 
Deepening Gross TFP ZCC 
Net TFP 
(Malmquist) TEC TC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Austria 56,143 69,138 1.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 
Belgium 62,717 74,879 1.3 0.9 0.4 0.6 -0.2 -0.7 0.5 
Bulgaria 13,230 21,187 3.4 0.4 3 6 -2.8 0 -2.8 
Croatia 18,169 35,104 4.8 2.2 2.6 1.2 1.3 1.4 0 
Czech Rep. 29,239 45,317 3.2 1.6 1.6 2.1 -0.5 0 -0.5 
Denmark 46,606 64,478 2.3 1.8 0.6 0.3 0.3 -0.6 0.9 
Estonia 14,320 38,007 7.2 2.7 4.4 1.2 3.1 3.4 -0.2 
Finland 41,318 65,417 3.3 0.7 2.6 0.6 2 1.3 0.6 
France 56,917 69,014 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 -0.7 0.9 
Germany 54,660 64,692 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
Greece 42,493 58,178 2.3 0.9 1.3 1.4 -0.1 0 -0.1 
Hungary 24,740 41,848 3.8 2.9 0.9 -0.3 1.2 0.7 0.4 
Iceland 40,616 58,945 2.7 1.3 1.3 -0.6 1.9 0.4 1.5 
Ireland 47,928 81,673 3.9 1.5 2.4 -0.2 2.6 0.5 2.1 
Italy 59,565 68,952 1.1 1 0.1 1.2 -1.1 0 -1.1 
Latvia 10,806 29,298 7.4 7 0.4 -3.2 3.6 3 0.7 
Lithuania 14,767 33,401 6 4.6 1.3 -0.4 1.7 2.6 -0.8 
Netherlands 57,728 69,648 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.1 -0.3 0.4 
Norway 68,289 90,345 2 0.4 1.6 0.5 1 0 1 
Poland 17,360 34,310 5 2.5 2.4 1.4 1 2 -1 
Portugal 33,849 40,070 1.2 1.7 -0.5 1 -1.5 -0.1 -1.4 
Romania 11,695 21,700 4.5 0 4.5 6.8 -2.2 0 -2.2 
Slovak Rep. 19,976 38,938 4.9 0.7 4.1 4.6 -0.4 1.7 -2.1 
Slovenia 34,618 51,204 2.8 1.5 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2 
Spain 49,125 57,919 1.2 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.7 0.8 
Sweden 44,187 63,261 2.6 0.7 1.9 0.1 1.8 0.9 0.9 
Switzerland 56,043 66,193 1.2 0.2 1 0.3 0.7 -0.4 1.1 
Turkey 24,341 34,960 2.6 3.1 -0.4 2.4 -2.8 0 -2.8 
United Kingdom 48,070 67,203 2.4 1.8 0.6 0.2 0.4 0 0.4 
             
EU-16 51,602 66,941 1.9 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.4 -0.1 0.4 
EU-13 21,067 37,248 4.5 2.4 2.1 1.7 0.4 1.2 -0.7 
Overall Mean     3.0 1.6 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.5 -0.1 
Note: EU-16 include the more industrialized countries; EU-13 include the NMS and CCs, namely Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovak Republic. The CCs include: Croatia, Island, and Turkey 
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Fig.6. The impact of the technological capabilities on the production frontier, overall averages  
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
EU-16
EU-13
 
 26 
Fig. 7. Labour productivity decomposition: capital deepening, technological capabilities, and net TFP 
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Fig. 8. Gross TFP decomposition: catch up effect and exogenous technical change 
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Table A.1. – Static impact of technological capabilities (equation 5) 
 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   Mean 
Austria 0.93 0.9 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.86  0.87 
Belgium 1 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98  0.95 
Bulgaria 0.45 0.5 0.53 0.48 0.46 0.51 0.57 0.61 0.68 0.68 0.7 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.73  0.6 
Croatia 0.74 0.76 0.8 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86  0.82 
Czech Rep. 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.7 0.73 0.76  0.65 
Denmark 0.99 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 1  0.99 
Estonia 0.76 0.75 0.78 0.8 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.86  0.83 
Finland 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1 1 1  0.99 
France 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97  0.96 
Germany 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.9 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88  0.89 
Greece 0.79 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.8 0.8 0.8  0.77 
Hungary 0.88 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.9  0.86 
Iceland 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 1 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.89  0.95 
Ireland 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.98 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  0.97 
Italy 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.82 0.81 0.8 0.8 0.81  0.86 
Latvia 1 1 1 1 1 0.96 0.86 0.82 0.85 0.81 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.76  0.87 
Lithuania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.93  0.97 
Netherlands 1 1.03 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97  0.96 
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
Poland 0.92 0.89 0.9 0.91 0.9 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.9 0.91 0.94 0.94  0.9 
Portugal 0.73 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.63  0.66 
Romania 0.34 0.37 0.4 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.58  0.46 
Slovak Rep. 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.6 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.7 0.73 0.79  0.64 
Slovenia 0.82 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.8 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.82  0.8 
Spain 0.85 0.89 0.81 0.8 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.79 0.8 0.81 0.82 0.82  0.81 
Sweden 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98  0.99 
Switzerland 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.94  0.91 
Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
UK 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 
                    
Mean 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.88   0.86 
 
 28 
Appendix B – DEA linear programs 
 
The previous definitions are still too abstract and we need to operationalize them. A way of doing it is 
by using the DEA technology. The DEA technology satisfies our previous axioms, thus is a good 
candidate. Since we deal with a balanced panel dataset, for each time period we can collect all the 
observed outputs into a Kx1 vector 
tY , all the observed inputs into a Kx2 matrix [ ]ttt LKX ,=  and all 
the observed external variables into a Kx4 matrix 
tZ . The technology set is defined as the convex 
linear envelope of the data at each point in time (DEA): 
( ) ( ){ }0λλZzλXxλYzxZYX ≥≥≥≤= ,,,:,,,, tttttt yyT  
The output distance is calculated using the DEA technology. For every time period the following K 
linear programs are solved for computing the actual distance functions at each time period for each 
observation (this means solving KxT linear programs). For every time period the following K 
linear programs are solved: 
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We need to compute also mixed period distance functions. The relevant linear programming 
problems are as follow: 
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